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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD E. LOWE and 
BEVERLY LOWE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Case No. 940388-CA 
vs. 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY and 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY dba 
KYLE C. GOLIGHTLY CONSTRUCTION 
Priority No. 2 
Defendants and Appellees. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992 as amended). The matter was appropriately poured over to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(4) (1992 as 
Amended); U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee will adopt the issues set out in Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 4B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee will adopt the statement of the case as set out in Appellant's Brief pursuant to 
Rule 25B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE 
1. On August, 1989, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants alleging breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment (R. 2-10). 
2. On September 22, 1989, the Defendants' Golightly filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim (R. 40-44). 
3. On September 28, 1989, the Plaintiffs filed a Reply to the Counterclaim (R. 49-
50). 
4. On July 27, 1990, the Defendants Golightly filed an Offer of Judgment in the sum 
of $7,500.00 together with costs accrued to date (R. 81-82). 
5. On March 18, 1991, the Plaintiffs settled their claims against Deseret Bank and 
an appropriate Motion, Stipulation and Order of Dismissal was entered (R. 114-115). 
6. The case was tried to Senior Judge Venoy Christofferson, sitting without a jury 
on August 24, 25, and 26, 1992 (R. 178-183). 
7. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court ordered the parties to submit Memoranda 
to the Court to aide in rendering a decision (R. 178-183). The Defendants submitted their Post-
Trial Memorandum with exhibits to the court on April 12, 1993 (R. 201-329). The Plaintiffs 
submitted their Reply Memorandum on May 11, 1993 (R. 331-347). 
8. The court entered its Memorandum Decision on June 1, 1993 (R. 354-360). 
9. After several drafts, the final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
were entered on May 9, 1994. The decision of the lower court found that the Plaintiffs had 
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failed to meet their burden and denied any relief. The court found that the Plaintiffs had 
improperly terminated their contract with the Defendants but denied any specific relief to the 
Defendants. The court awarded the Defendants their costs after the Offer of Judgment was filed, 
in the amount of $4,829.94 (R. 427-443). 
10. The Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on May 9, 1994 (R. 416-417). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Lowe desired to build a home in Orem, Utah, and began the 
preparation of house plans in 1988. (See Transcript page 23, lines 9-20.) 
2. In preparation for the construction of their home, they went to Gill Hayes to prepare 
the plans and specifications. (See Transcript page 24, lines 18-21.) 
3. When the plans were completed, the Plaintiffs obtained three bids, of which the 
Defendant's bid was the middle bid of those obtained. (See Transcript page 25, lines 16-24.) 
4. One of the reasons why the Defendant was granted the bid was that the Plaintiffs' 
son, Clay Lowe, was the foreman for the Defendant's construction company and would provide 
some job security for the Plaintiffs' son. (See Transcript page 26, lines 4-14.) 
5. Several documents were drafted with regard to the parties arrangement. The 
documents include: 
a. Plans and specifications generated by Gill Hayes, identified as Defendant's 
Exhibit 34. 
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b. A document entitled "Sales Agreement" dated September 9, 1988, identified 
as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5, attached to Appellant's brief as Exhibit 1. 
c. Building Loan Agreement and Assignment of Account that included Deseret 
Bank dated September 21, 1988, identified as plaintiff's Exhibit 9, and attached to 
Appellant's brief as Addendum 2. 
d. A cost breakdown that outlined certain allowance items identified as 
Defendant's Exhibit 28. 
e. Inspection report which is plaintiff's Exhibit 6. 
None of the documents contain language commonly known as an integration clause stating that 
that particular written document is a complete expression of the parties' agreement. (See 
Exhibits identified in paragraph 5 above.) 
6. Although Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 was introduced as an Exhibit and is entitled "Sales 
Agreement", it is signed only by Kyle Golightly and was not signed by the Plaintiffs. The 
document itself was prepared for the purpose of submitting it to American Savings and Loan 
Association to obtain financing. There was no financing ever received from American Savings 
and Loan Association and therefore the contract has no legal consequence. (See Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 5 attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' brief.) 
7. In addition to the written documents, there were verbal agreements as testified to by 
the Plaintiffs which also were a part of the parties' original contract i.e. a hydronic heating 
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system installed in the home that was never documented on the plans and specifications. (See 
Transcript page 48, lines 8 through page 49 line 18.) 
8. Plaintiffs testified at trial that they retained control over certain subcontractors i.e. 
masonry (Beverly Lowe transcript pages 46, lines 19-21; Kyle Golightly transcript page 497), 
heating and plumbing (transcript page 110 line 23 through page 111, line 1), roofing (transcript 
page 47, lines 17-18), electrical (transcript page 46, lines 14-16), excavation (transcript page 
500, lines 8-16), siding (transcript page 500, lines 3-7), spiral staircase (transcript page 502). 
9. Much of the delay in the construction of the home was due to the subcontractors hired 
by the Plaintiffs, which included Mrs. Lowe's brother, Mr. Steve Anderson, an unlicensed 
plumbing contractor, who was to install the hydronic heating system. The problems caused by 
Mr. Anderson delayed the project approximately one month. (See transcript page 400, Ernest 
Muirhead.) Other delays were caused as a result of the electrician who was also Plaintiffs' 
subcontractor who took approximately six weeks to perform his duties which should have taken 
three days. (See transcript pages 328, 453.) 
10. During the construction itself, several changes in the plans and specifications were 
completed at the request of the Plaintiffs, which included construction of a loft (transcript page 
60 lines 12-24), a two-step rise in the family room (transcript page 61 lines 7-18), a drop ceiling 
in the front room (transcript page 61 lines 21 through page 62, line 13), indirect lighting in the 
dining room (transcript page 62, lines 14-22). 
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11. As to other modifications during the construction, Beverly Lowe testified at trial as 
follows: 
A: Oh, the way you're putting it is not how it was. From the very beginning I told 
Kyle, I says, now, as we go along, since - these things can't really be drawn into the 
plan because the walls had to be in before I could explain to him what I wanted, okay? 
And that's when I explained to him, okay, I want this, this wall to look like this with the 
indirect lighting behind it. 
Q: So once something was framed, you would then go to Kyle, or was it principally to 
Kyle or to Clay or to whom? 
A: Clay. 
Q: To Clay? 
A: Kyle wasn't ever to be found. 
Q: So this was Clay? 
A: Yeah, Clay. 
Q: Was Clay on the job? 
A: Yeah, he was more than Kyle. 
Q: So you'd go to Clay and you'd say — 
A: And I would relate the message to tell Kyle this is what I wanted. 
Q: Were you principally the artistic, you know, control director? I mean when I say 
that I'm saying were you the one that really voiced what you wanted more than Mr. 
Lowe? 
A: Yes, but I can't read plans. 
Q: Well, but when you say you'd see a wall and you'd say, gee, I'd like this to come 
out like this or I'd like this to do this. 
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A: Yes. 
Transcript pages 63 line 1 thro 
The Deseret Banking Building Loan Agreement, paragraph 1 ca lis for a six month 
. U 0 1 1 c j a t e t j i r e e 
months to Juru* ^K i o v * • ihey renewed their loan with Deseret Bank (transcript page 70, 
Beverly Lov.., , j • 
contract did not extend the time for completion of the home (transcript pages 187-188). 
13. The Defendant had no incentive to extend his liability on the loan unless lie was 
given additional time to complete the project (transcript page 562). 
The bid for the home submitted by the Defe i idant was for $117,100,, (See transcript 
page I lgh page 31. In ic 8) 
Ihe Lowes, however, only borrowed from the bank $94,500 (transcript page 30, 
lines 2(122), 
16. On April 25, 1989, Mrs. Lowe came to the Defendant's home and spoke to Mr and 
Mrs. Golightly about creating a new cost breakdown so that she could approach Deseret Bank 
an ::I se • 2 1 :: additional finaT . a this time that Mrs. Lowe presented her document entitled 
"Pre-Bid" which was introduced as Defendant's Exhibit 27, to the Defendant and requested that 
i.e dumbwaiter, inside railing and stairs, Tliese three items Appellants contend Defendant 
should have paid for. (See Statement ol hitl 10 ol i appellants bud.) 
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17. On May 10, 1989, the Defendant had a meeting with the Plaintiffs. At this point 
in time, the Plaintiffs unequivocally informed Defendant that they had no more money and the 
Defendant was terminated from the project (transcript pages 69-70, 107 and 556-557). 
18. Defendant requested that they be permitted to complete the project for the contract 
price but were denied the opportunity to do so (transcript page 560). Defendant did not return 
to the job pursuant to the Plaintiffs' demands. 
19. At the time of the termination of the Defendant, the home had been framed, the roof 
was on, the garage was mostly sheetrocked, the hydronic heating was complete and the brick 
was completed (transcript page 556). 
20. The trial court found, in its Memorandum Decision, as follows: 
This Court further finds the Defendant had spent up to the time of termination by 
withdrawals the sum of $89,086.88 and before the time was up for his completion the 
Plaintiffs in effect told him that he would have to complete the contract without any more 
money to be given him, even though his contract was in the amount of $117,100. In 
other words, the Defendant would have to take a loss of some $27,000 to complete the 
contract. The Court finds that he should not be forced to do so and that this is a breach 
on the part of the Plaintiffs. This is demonstrated by testimony of the plaintiff, Beverly 
Lowe, mainly in the trial transcripts on pages 69 and 70. (R. 356 included as Addendum 
5 to Appellant's Brief.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Parol Evidence rule does not preclude the entry of extrinsic evidence or parol 
evidence for the purpose of determining whether there was an integrated agreement between the 
parties. Particularly, when neither of the parties is relying on just one written document. 
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The trial court properly allowed parol, evidence to determine \ whether there was an 
integrated contract. 
The trial court also properly allowed parol evidence relating to changes agreed upon by 
original plans and specifications. The authorities cited demonstrate that even assuming 
arguendo, that there was an integrated 
subsequently modified or altered, either in writing or orally and that the parol evidence rule does 
not preclude the entry of evidence relating to subsequent agreements, but rather the parol 
!
- * understandings and negotiations which are 
antecedent to an integral * 
Mill .lie well substantiated In ' III " 
evidence deduced at trial and demonstrate that the trial judge did fully consider the facts and 
testimony in entering his ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
they take issue in two general areas. First, that 
the trial court allowed parol evidence to be admitted at trial and secondly, they take issue with 
adequacy 
closing arguments identified as a Post-Trial Memorandum which are pertinent to the issues at 
hand At page 11 of Plaintiff/Appellant's Post-Trial I femorandum, it states: 
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There were several times during the course of the trial that parol evidence 
objections were raised. The Plaintiff does not believe that they greatly affect the issue 
of liability or damages but they do feel that the issue is of large enough importance to 
briefly address here. . . . 
At page 12 of Plaintiff/Appellants' Post-Trial Memorandum it states: 
The Plaintiff will therefore agree to pay for all signed change orders and for 
change orders that were orally agreed to by both parties. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT MISCONSTRUES THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
Corbin on Contracts defines the Parol Evidence Rule in Section 573 as follows: 
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they 
have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, 
whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be 
admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing, (emphasis added) 
Corbin on Contracts. 573 p. 357 (Courtesy copy attached as Addendum.) 
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes all evidence which relates to antecedent understandings 
and negotiations, so long as the contract was an accurate integration of the parties' agreement. 
POINT n 
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF PAROL 
EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS AN INTEGRATED 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
Corbin on Contracts. Section 582 states: 
There are thousands of cases in which courts have declared that parol evidence is not 
admissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written contract. It is stated in the form 
of a rule of evidence for the exclusion of offered testimony. In many of these cases, 
however, the published report itself shows that the offered testimony was actually heard 
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and its credibility weighed. In spite of it, the court finds that there was a complete and 
accurate integration in writing, and then justifies its decision by repeating the "Parol 
Evidence Rule" to the effect that such testimony is not admissible to vary or contradict 
the writing, 
Having admitted and weighed the evidence to determine whether there is such an 
integration in writing and having found that there is, that very evidence becomes quite 
immaterial for the purpose of varying or contradicting the integration that that plan has 
been nullified. It was material and was admissible on one issue; but the decision of that 
issue is that the parties agreed to substitute one written integration for all their antecedent 
negotiations. Until this decision is reached, we cannot know that there has been a 
substitution. The evidence may clearly show that there was no agreement to substitute 
the written instrument for a former oral agreement, in which case an action for breach 
of that oral agreement is not prevented by the Parol Evidence Rule. 
The fact that the rule has been stated in such a definite and dogmatic form as a rule of 
admissibility is unfortunate. It has an air of authority and certainty that has grown with 
much repetition. Without doubt, it has deterred counsel from making an adequate 
analysis and research and from offering full testimony that was admissible for many 
purposes. Without doubt, and also, it has caused a court to refuse to hear testimony that 
ought to have been heard. If mystery of the written word is still such that a paper 
document may close the door to a showing that it was never assented to as a complete 
integration. 
Corbin on Contracts, 582 p. 444 447. (Courtesy copy attached as Addendum.) 
Wall -tii'j J Li"! ih.j« MI|I|KH('I llio farcfoiiif point of law. In Union Rank v. Swenson. 707 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the court stated: 
The parol evidence rule as a principle of contract interpretation, has a 'very narrow 
application. Simply stated, the rule operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements,, or representations offered, for the purpose 
of varying or .adding to the terms of an integrated contract. (Citations omitted) 
Therefore, a court must first determine whether the writing was intended by the parties 
to be an integration. In resolving this preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, 
indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible. Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 638 P.2d 
at 1194. 
] ] 
Union Bank at 665. 
Appellants contend that there existed an integrated contract which expressed the entire 
agreement of the parties. Appellant, however, cannot point to just one document that forms a 
basis for an integrated contract. Contrarily, Appellants refers to several documents which 
contain no provision within the documents referring to the other written documents and seeks 
the court's ruling that all of the written documents combined evolve into one single integrated 
contract and request the court to make that determination based upon the face of the documents 
without the assistance of Parol Evidence. 
In paragraph 2 of Appellants' Statement of Facts, they refer to a Sales Agreement dated 
September 9, 1988 as one of the contracts between the parties. In paragraph 3 of their 
Statement of Facts, they refer to a Building Loan Agreement and Assignment of Account that 
includes Deseret Bank dated September 21, 1988. In paragraph 15 of Appellants' Statement of 
Facts, they state: 
Under the terms of the contract the Plaintiffs were given the following rights: 
Owners will help as much as possible on items where possible where credit is 
given to them on cost. Owners have the right to choose subcontractors if they 
stay within the costs. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6. The Plaintiffs were not given the right to control, supervise or 
otherwise interfere with the Defendant's performance of their contract. 
The document referred to in paragraph 15 of Appellant's Brief is yet a third written document. 
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If the Court looks to the three written documents, It will I mil 11n11 Hint1 is no reli'iena1 
ocuments themselves that would tie the documents into one agreement, nor is there any 
integration clause in any of the three documents referred to. 
ill iiiiiiiii linn impossible nil title liriiri i iiiiii in iiliiii i III.II iln lliivi written documents are but 
one integrated contract without the use of Parol Evidence when the writings make no reference 
to each other. 
Again relying upon the testimony offered by Plaintiff/Appellant it is clear that there were 
other matters which the parties agreed on that were not included in any written documents 
In \»\ i'\ i 'if 111 » f Hit Irss ivi'iu' if (dirt of the agreement between the parties. Beverly Lowe testified 
as follows: 
Q . Now, at what point «il I In hyilmnu hwlin^ became pail of 
the plans for the home? 
A, I < i<ml believe. This is a. joke, 
I J MI i I i i i i I i i «P i i i i iw i i n 111 iwiwJ I I I I I I I i I i I n ( . ( i t i e i t i In lln i|n( \tfiOii please. 
J i. l*'roin the very very beginning it was hydronic heat. It was never anything but 
hydronic heat ever. 
Q: And can you show me . • anywhere where it indicates that hydronic heat 
was to be used in the home? 
A
 • No, because — 
A: Gill Hayes didn't know how to draw the hydronic heat in. He drew forced air heat, 
but he said that it was understood between he and Kyle and everybody else that it was 
hydronic heat. 
Transcript page 48. 
Gilbert Hayes who was the architect who drew the plans for the home at the request of 
the Lowes (see transcript page 246) stated at trial with regard to the hydronic heating system: 
Q: While I'm thinking of it, the plans do not have any provisions on them for hydronic 
heat, do they? 
A: No, they don't. 
Q: In fact, it calls for a furnace on the plans, does it not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you become aware at some point in time that the Lowes wanted hydronic 
heating? 
A: Yes, from the start. I drew the hot air system, forced air system simply because the 
city needs some kind of system on their plans to approve it. 
Q: But you never noted on there hydronic heating or anything like that? 
A: No. 
Transcript page 261. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant's expert, Clark D. Palfreyman, also testified that the hydronic 
heating was not included on the plans. (See Transcript page 315.) Several additional examples 
could be given that would identify that the hydronic heating system was not on the plans but was 
installed in the home. For example, Steve Anderson who is Beverly Lowe's (Plaintiff/Appellant) 
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brother was the subcontractor who installed the hydronic heating system. Mr. Muirhead was 
the city inspector who inspected the hydronic heating system. There could only be two 
explanations as to how the installation of the hydronic heating system was made a part of the 
agreement between the parties. Either the parties agreed to the hydronic heating system as part 
of their original contract and consequently, further demonstrates that the agreement between the 
parties was not integrated into a written agreement or else the parties agreed to install the 
hydronic heating system subsequent to some written agreement which became a new agreement. 
In Appellant's brief they invite the court to rule that the Parol Evidence rule should 
exclude the evidence such as that offered above with regard to the hydronic heating system. 
Clearly any written or oral agreements entered into between the parties subsequent to any 
contract are allowed. Further Parol Evidence is appropriate and required to determine if one, 
two or all three written documents referred to by Appellants formed an agreement between the 
parties. Certainly the testimony of Appellants regarding verbal agreements is also a compelling 
reason why the Trial Court accepted said testimony. 
The testimony set out verbatim above the Plaintiff/Appellant made quite apparent that the 
written contracts asserted by Appellant in their brief was not a final and complete integration of 
the agreement between the parties. To take the position alleged by the plaintiff in their brief that 
parol evidence should have been excluded, the logical conclusion would be that since the 
hydronic heating system was not included in the plans and specifications the court should not 
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have allowed any Parol Evidence thereto. It would create a true injustice to both parties when 
it is clear that the parties agreed to hydronic heating, for the Court to exclude such testimony. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES AGREED TO CHANGES TO THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
DURING CONSTRUCTION THAT SUBSTITUTED A SUBSEQUENT CONTRACT 
FOR WHICH PAROL EVIDENCE IS PROPER. 
The Parol Evidence Rule does not exclude evidence of new contracts whether written or 
oral that are entered into after a written contract. Corbin on Contracts Section 574 states: 
Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or modified by subsequent 
agreement of the parties. No contract whether oral or written can be varied, 
contradicted, or discharged by an antecedent agreement. 
Today may control the effect of what happened yesterday; but what happened yesterday 
cannot change the effect of what happens today. This, it is believed is the substance of 
what has been unfortunately called the "Parol Evidence Rule". ... it is now perfectly 
clear that informal contracts, whether written or oral, can be modified and discharged 
by subsequent agreement, whether written or oral. 
Corbin on Contracts. 574 p. 371-372. 
There were several incidences at trial where both the plaintiff and the Defendant agreed 
and the court so found where changes were made to the plans and specifications that were 
incorporated into the original contract. (See paragraph 11 of the State of Facts.) 
The authorities cited above make clear that the trial court properly allowed Parol 
Evidence both on the issue of integration and subsequent oral and written agreements. 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
At page 29 of Appellant's Brief, they accurately reflect the point of law with regard to 
the challenge to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact as follows: 
An Appellant must martial the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous,' 
In re State of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
At page 28 of Appellant's brief, it appears that the Findings of Fact, which they are 
contesting, are Findings of Fact numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12. Appellee will address 
each Finding of Fact and the proof in the record establishing a basis for each of those 
enumerated. 
Findings of Fact 3 and 4 read as follows: 
3. There was significant disagreement between the parties as to the specific facts 
and much contradiction in the evidence as presented by the parties and the respective 
witnesses. 
4. The contradictions not only existed between the respective witnesses for the 
parties, but also significantly as between the witnesses for parties testifying on the same 
side. There is considerable contradiction in the testimony of the Plaintiffs themselves 
regarding similar issues. This leads the Court to question the credibility of the testimony 
presented by the Plaintiffs on these particular issues. 
At trial, Beverly Lowe (Plaintiff/Appellant) testified: 
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Q: When you went to Kyle and originally had him bid the project, did you indicate to 
Kyle that you wanted him to or that you wanted to have control over certain areas of the 
construction of the home? 
A: Kyle knew that from the beginning, yes. 
Q: Was that a request of yours? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what areas did you request to maintain control over? 
A: The heating, plumbing, electrical and the brick. 
Q: As well as the roof? 
A: The roof, yeah. 
Transcript page 46. 
When Richard Lowe (Plaintiff/Appellant) testified, he indicated as follows: 
Q: You wanted to be in charge of the heating and plumbing? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was Steve Anderson that was going to do that? 
A: Steve Anderson. 
Q: The rough electrical was Gary Rose? 
A: That wasn't a choice. That was something he agreed to. I didn't even know Gary 
Rose from then, only that he was Dave's brother. 
Q: It is your position that Kyle was the one that selected him? 
A: He asked for Dave's one because Dave was a lower bidder and we just went with 
that, same with the brick. 
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Q: Then you had Brad Stevens doing brick work on the home? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did the brick work also include stone work? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was something you that were in charge of? 
A: Well, that was something that wasn't done and I done after. I wasn't in charge of 
the brick work, no. 
Transcript pages 159-160. 
The Plaintiffs also testified inconsistently with regard to an extension of time for which the 
Defendants would complete the home. Beverly Lowe testified as follows: 
Q: You went to Deseret Bank in March for an extension, correct? 
A: Yes, about three or four. 
Q: Okay. The extension was to permit Mr. Golightly to complete the home by I think 
March [June] 22, 1989. 
A: Uh-huh, yes. 
Q: And that was an agreement that you signed and Mr. Golightly signed as well, 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And isn't it true that that extension acted as an extension of the contract in which to 
build the home? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: You agreed with Mr. Golightly and with the bank we will finish the home by June 
22nd I think, 1989? . . . You had indicated you had an agreement with Kyle. Did you 
have an agreement with him, say, Kyle, why are we going so slow, can we get this 
finished by June 22nd? 
A: Every time we got a chance to talk to him, yes, why is it taking so long, yes. 
Q: Did Kyle ever represent to you, Bev, we can finish this home by June 22nd? 
A: Yes. 
Q: We've got the substantial delays over with, or at least you had hoped. Then you 
agreed with Kyle to permit him until the 22nd of June to complete the home, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Transcript pages 70-72. 
Conversely, Richard Lowe testified at trial: 
Q: Okay, and then you, from determining how slowly the home was going, you went 
to Deseret Bank near the end of March and applied for an extension, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you agreed at that time to permit Mr. Golightly until the end of June, June 22nd 
to complete the contract on the home, correct? 
A: No. 
Q: Well, doesn't the Extension Agreement that you signed indicate that the home was 
to be completed by June 22nd? 
A: When we went over for an extension on the loan it had nothing to do with Kyle's 
agreement to do the home for a certain amount at a certain time. 
Transcript pages 187-188. 
Findings of Fact 5 and 6 read as follows: 
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5. This case is further complicated by the fact that the Plaintiffs' son, Clay, was 
the foreman for the Defendants' construction company on this project. Also, another son 
of the Plaintiffs, Shaun, was working for Defendants' construction company on this 
project. Clay, as foreman and son assumed a leading and responsible role in the decision 
making process as it related to the construction of the home and changes that took place 
in the construction of the home. Part of the reason that the Defendant was selected to 
build the home was due to the fact that the Plaintiffs' sons would be working on the 
home. 
6. Clay would often times confer with Plaintiffs, either together or apart and with 
or without Mr. Golightly and discuss and determine how the house was to be built and 
what desired changes should be incorporated into the home. These changes would be 
made and incorporated as a result of these conversations and at times occurred without 
Defendants participation or knowledge until after the fact. The son, in essence, acted 
as an agent not only for the Defendants but for the Plaintiffs as their son in making 
changes that reflected the Plaintiffs desired changes on the home. 
These Findings of Fact are substantiated by the following excerpts from the testimony at trial. 
Beverly Lowe, the plaintiff, testified as follows: 
Q: And you ultimately ended up having Kyle build the home; is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Or entering into the contract. Why did you select Kyle? 
A: Because it was a reasonable price, and my son indicated he wanted to have a part in 
building our home that would keep, you know, him on the job, and the main reason is 
he indicated to me that he was a custom builder and that's the kind I needed. I was 
looking for a custom builder. 
Transcript page 26. 
Kyle Golightly testified as follows: 
Q: Was there a foreman on this job, Kyle? 
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A: Clay was the foreman. Clay was the one that would deal with Beverly daily on the 
changes that she was making. There were times when Clay would — would be at a point 
where we needed to do something and Clay had to go talk to Beverly to find out how she 
wanted it. 
Transcript p. 518. 
The Plaintiff, Beverly Lowe, testified with regard to changes and conversations with her son, 
Clay, as follows: 
Q: Do you recall any other extras that you had called for or that you had requested to 
be made to the home prior to Mr. Golightly's termination? 
A: Yeah, but they were extras that would either be less money in some areas or just 
very little. 
Q: Let's go over those just real quickly. What do you recall as being extras? 
A: In the south end of the home there is a loft which only required a floor to be put up 
there which wouldn't have amounted to very much at all. 
Q: Did you request that that be done? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was okayed by Mr. Golightly to let's do it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But that's not reflected by a written change order, is it? 
A: No, but he agreed that that was extra. 
Q: And you agreed to pay for that? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: And today you agree to pay for that, you think you should be responsible for the 
reasonable cost of that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Other change orders? 
A: There is a two-step rise in the family room which was another bit of lumber that they 
would have needed, about maybe an hour of work for a carpenter, if that. 
Q: And you requested that that be done? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And was that during the -
A: Building. 
Q: The building process. That was a change from what the plans called for? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: And you think that you should be responsible for that request? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay, other areas? 
A: There was a drop ceiling in the front room. 
Q: Was that a change from the plans? 
A: Probably. I don't remember. 
Q: Had the ceiling already been framed in? 
A: I don't know. 
Q: But nevertheless there was a change that you requested there? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: And was that change completed? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you feel like you should be responsible for that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Even though there's no change order, written change order? 
A: I would have signed a written change order if he would have gotten one. 
Q: Other changes that you recall? 
A: The dining room had a — just kind of an outset where an indirect lighting goes 
behind it. It's -- I don't know how to explain it. It would have taken a little bit of — 
you know, I don't know what they used ~ plywood, to do that, build that. 
Q: And you requested a change be made there? 
A: Not a change, just an add. These are all just little adds, add-ons. 
Q: Okay, but this was something, it was a change from the plans and said let's alter this 
here or there? 
A: Oh, the way you're putting it is not how it was. From the very beginning I told 
Kyle, I says, now, as we go along, since — these things can't really be drawn into the 
plan because the walls had to be in before I could explain to him what I wanted, okay? 
And that's when I explained to him, okay, I want this, this wall to look like this with the 
indirect lighting behind it. 
Q: So once something was framed, you would then go to Kyle, or was it principally to 
Kyle or to Clay or to whom? 
A: Clay. 
Q: To Clay? 
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A: Kyle wasn't ever to be found. 
Q: So this was Clay? 
A: Yeah, Clay. 
Q: Was Clay on the job? 
A: Yeah, he was more than Kyle. 
Q: So you'd go to Clay and you'd say -
A: And I would relate the message to tell Kyle this is what I wanted. 
Q: Were you principally the artistic, you know, control director? I mean when I say 
that I'm saying were you the one that really voiced what you wanted more than Mr. 
Lowe? 
A: Yes, but I can't read plans. 
Q: Well, but when you say you'd see a wall and you'd say, gee, I'd like this to come 
out like this or I'd like this to do this. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Other changes that you requested or adds as you referred to them? 
A: That's all I can think of. 
Q: Do you recall the pit being changed in the home teaching room? 
A: No. We've always — I don't know, change. No, he knew we were having a — what 
do you mean change? 
Q: Well, the pit as it sits now comes this way, and isn't it true that the plans originally 
called for it to go the other way? 
A: You mean just facing a different way? 
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Q: Correct. 
A: Possibly. I don't remember. 
Transcript pages 60-64. 
Finding of Fact 7 reads as follows: 
7. The Plaintiffs selected a draftsman to prepare the plans for the home. There 
was conflicting testimony as to whether the plans were properly drawn in all respects. 
As the project was being completed and changes were requested, most of the requested 
changes were not reflected on the plans even though Plaintiffs acknowledge requesting 
or consenting to the changes. 
As it relates to the requested changes, see discussion regarding Finding of Fact 6 for 
documentation to the record. 
As a result of the addition of three inches of concrete to accommodate the hydronic 
heating system on the second floor, there was not sufficient room for the spiral staircase to be 
installed according to the plans and specifications in that there was not enough head room as one 
of the stairs do to the three inch cement differential not included in the plans (see Transcript 
pages 546 and 547). There was also a conflict over the architectural plans that the way the plans 
were drawn, the home would not support the brick on the north side of the house without the 
installation of an eye beam. (See Transcript pages 537-538). 
Finding of Fact Number 8 reads as follows: 
8. At the outset of the contract the Plaintiffs desired to maintain control over the 
work and accomplishment of many of the subcontractors, as they had family members 
and other "connections" that they believed would be advantageous for them in building 
the home. These subcontractors included areas such items as countertops, cabinets, 
windows, heating, plumbing, roofing, electrical, foundations, excavation, and masonry. 
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The Defendants did not have control over these areas as the Plaintiffs desired to be 
responsible for them. There was conflicting evidence as to who maintained control over 
the spiral staircase subcontractor and whether or not it was included in the bid. There 
is no amount identified on the cost breakdown for the spiral staircase which supports the 
Defendants' position. 
As to control over the subcontractors, see the excerpts from the transcript and discussion on 
page 18 of this Brief. As it relates to the issue of the staircase, the following evidence was 
deduced at trial. Kyle Golightly testified as follows: 
A: We looked at the plans and went through all the items. There were some of the 
items that I wasn't sure of and I explained that to the Lowes, and we had a common 
understanding that there were items that I wasn't going to bid on. 
Q: Why? 
A: Because I didn't know exactly what they wanted, and he [Richard Lowe] had this 
friend Roy Johns who did the welding that he wanted to take care of the staircase and 
all the rod iron. You know, I hadn't really done a lot of rod iron and I wasn't sure how 
much it was going to cost, and so they agreed to take care of that. 
Transcript page 492. 
Richard Lowe testified at trial with regard to the staircase as follows: 
Q: Mr. Lowe, there were some items that were on the plans and some things that 
weren't on the plans. Do you recall ever having seen anything on the cost breakdown 
that spelled out that Mr. Golightly or you would be responsible for the spiral staircase? 
A: Definitely not. 
Q: Do you recall a conversation with Mr. Golightly wherein there was an agreement 
that the spiral staircase would cost whatever the spiral staircase cost? 
A: That spiral staircase was put -- was told exactly how much it would be and it was 
to go right into the bid. Dave Rose is the only one that put it right in the bid as a 
breakdown. 
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Q: Do you see the spiral staircase as being included in the bid anywhere, in the cost 
breakdown? 
A: No, but there's a lot of things I don't see that's separate. 
Transcript pages 160-161. 
Finding of Fact Number 9 reads as follows: 
9. Plaintiffs agreed and clearly understood that they were also solely responsible 
for any overspending in the areas where they hired subcontractors. Conversely, the 
Plaintiffs were to be given credit from the contract amount for allowances for work 
performed on the contract by the subcontractors where they went under the allowance 
amount. However, in almost every case it appears the subcontractors exceeded the 
allowance amounts. 
Beverly Lowe testified at trial as follows: 
Q: And is it a fair statement to say that you knew that if these individuals went over the 
cost breakdown amount that you'd be responsible for those areas? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: That was your responsibility and you were not holding Kyle responsible for those 
areas? 
A: We knew that and he knew that, yes. 
Q: Right from the outset? 
A: Yes. 
Transcript pages 47-48. 
Finding of Fact Number 10 reads as follows: 
10. As a result of the Plaintiffs' subcontractors performance the project was 
delayed. These were in areas over which the Defendants had little control. Delays were 
caused by Steve Anderson, Mrs. Lowe's brother and an unlicensed plumbing contractor, 
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who failed city inspections on three (3) separate occasions. He could not recall how long 
the project was delayed until he saw the failed building inspection reports which reflected 
significant delay of approximately one month. The electrical work took approximately 
six weeks when it should have taken three days. 
Attached as Addendum 1 is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1^ wh^h is the inspection cards demonstrating 
Ihr i iii1. iHsfR't I it HI1, tin i in II1 null Hi I uwt iiuium ,i !--c iaiied inspections. 
"hIr Muirhead, who is the city inspector, testified at trial with regard to Mr. Anderson's 
license as follows: 
Q. Where did you meet him? 
A: I finally met him [Steve Anderson] at the end of the job, and I at that time asked him 
for a copy of his plumber's card which would attest that he was the plumber as he 
represented himself to be. 
"Was he able to present you with a plumber's card? 
A: Negative, and very shagrincd lo hml « m ili.il Ihr. work h;nl proceeded this far 
without proper licensing. 
Q: How did you resolve that problem? 
A: I made a note of it in this case so that if he made an ongoing situation of trying to 
do it on another job, then you would have a track record to submit to Judge Wyler at the 
State of Utah who would be the head for the Division of Occupational Licensing. 
Transcript pages 392 393. 
With regard to the electrical work, Kyle Golightly testified at trial as follows: 
Q: What other areas did the Lowes retain control i\w.\l> 
A: They chose their own electrician. I would never agree to hire an electrician by the 
hour. There is just no way that I'd do that. 
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Q: Why? 
A: Because you can't control the cost. 
Q: Did you know Mr. Rose? 
A: All I knew is that he was the brother of Dave Rose. I had no previous knowledge 
of him at all. 
Q: You heard Mr. Gary Rose - now, Gary was the electrician, correct? 
A: I believe so. 
Q: You heard Mr. Rose testify yesterday that his communications on this job were with 
the Lowes? 
A: Right. 
Q: What kind of interface did you have with Mr. Rose? 
A: The only interface I had with him is I wanted him to keep track of how many outlets 
and plugs and switches, so on and so forth, that we were putting in so we could compare 
it, you know, with what was on the plans. 
Q: Did you ever enter into an agreement with him as to how much he would be 
compensated? 
A: No. 
Q: . . . Now, he also indicated yesterday that it took him I believe about six weeks. 
A: Yes. 
Q: To complete the project. Is that an accurate estimate to the best of your recollection 
of how long he was on the job? 
A: That's an accurate estimate of what I remember him saying. 
Q: Do you recall him being on the job for about that period of time? 
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A: Yes. 
< l Wns (liiil In 11MI1 (1(1111" In < 'on 
i Yi/s rhat caused --1 mean an electrician should be in and out of there in a couple 
days. There's no way it should take six weeks. 
Tiansmpl pages 4l)8-4(R 
Finding of Fact Number 11 reads as follows: 
11. There were many changes made in accordance with the contract in writing 
while many other changes were made as a result of verbal requests and agreed to by both 
parties as to what the changes would be. These changes also caused delay to the job. 
(See discussion under Finding of Fact Number 6 and references to the transcript.) 
Finding of Fact Number 12 reads as follows: 
12, The financing for the home went through Deseret Bank with both Plaintiffs 
and the Defendant co-signing on the loan agreements. When it became apparent that the 
home was not going to be completed within the originally contemplated six months due 
to the delays, the parties entered into an extension for completion of the home. Both 
Plaintiffs and Defendants signed on a renewal loan with Deseret Bank and were 
responsible therefore. The Court finds that the parties extended the time in which to 
complete the construction of the home when they extended the loan. The Defendant was 
subsequently terminated prior to the agreed upon completion date. 
Plaintiffs consent to the extension is evidenced in Beverly Lowe's testimony. (See excerpt from 
Irdnsuipl of Binxirly I tnvi rcjianluiy, llm lUnntMOii cMI f»af»i *!ll ml llllns HmHI ) 
When one martials the evidence available and the transcript as required in the case law 
set out above, it becomes quite apparent that there was more than sufficient evidence in the 
transcript for the court to make the Findings. 
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It should be noted that the Utah Court of Appeals has stated in Wade v. Stangl. 232 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19: 
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court. Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991). 
Wade at 21. 
CONCLUSION 
At trial, the Plaintiffs admit there were understandings and agreements from the inception 
of the relationship between Plaintiffs and the Defendant which carried on throughout the 
construction of the home and, in fact, the agreements are evidenced by the actual building and 
construction of the home as set out in the example of the hydronic heating system. The 
testimony of the Plaintiffs that the parties' made verbal agreements from the beginning must be 
taken at face value, the hydronic heating system, for example, was always the agreement of the 
parties, even prior to any written documents. Plaintiffs acknowledge that that was the agreement 
between the parties. Either the written documents were not an integration of all of the 
agreements and understanding of the parties from the onset, or the parties agreed to the changes 
subsequent to the written documents and formed a new agreement between the parties. Under 
either scenario, Parol Evidence was appropriate for purposes of determining whether there was 
an integration as well as for the purpose of determining whether there were subsequent 
agreements. 
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Allium'11!1! Ap|Mll ,mf ' \\\l\\\ "i I'UMI hur l I'ha! "In - Mi'P'.h |Miol n/ulei ia: should IM»< he 
admitted, there is no corresponding justification or explanation for Plaintiffs' testimony, which 
substantiate that the written documents were not an integration and further that the parties on 
several occasions entered into subsequent agreements which altered the plans and specifications. 
Therefore, the parol evidence rule does not exclude the introduction of evidence for the 
|»in(H»Sf^ i lt)i which lint* * 'null itllnwcd t viidmor \r "omr in. 
Therefore, Appellees respectfully request this Court to affirm the decision of the District 
Tom I 
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ADDENDUM 
CHAPTER 26 
THE "PAROL EVIDENCE RULE" 
Sec. 
573. The Rule is a Rule of Substantive Contract Law, Not a Rule of 
Evidence. 
574. All Contracts can be Discharged by a Substituted Agreement. 
575. Statute of Frauds Compared with the "Parol Evidence Rule." 
576. Does the "Parol Evidence Rule" Exclude Parol Evidence? 
577. Evidence That No Contract has been Made or That an Exist-
ing Document was Not Executed as a Contract. 
578. Effect of Express Written Statement That there have been No 
Extrinsic Representations, Warranties, or Other Provisions, 
579. Parol Evidence Admissible for Purposes of Interpretation. 
580. Oral Proof of Fraud, Illegality, Accident, or Mistake. 
5^1. Partial Integration—Reduction of Only Part of an Agree-
ment to Writing. 
582. Evidence That the Writing was Not Assented to as a Complete 
and Accurate Integration. 
583. Oral Testimony of Additional Terms Not Expressed in Writing. 
584. Rule in Restatement, Contracts, Section 240(1), 
585. Additional Oral Promises and Warranties. 
586. Evidence Showing the True Consideration and That Acknowl-
edgment of Payment is Untrue. 
587. Deeds, Leases, Bonds, Bills and Notes are Generally Not Com-
plete Integrations of a Contract. 
1588. What is a "Written Contract," or an "Integration"? A Note or 
Memorandum is Not an "Integration." 
589. Evidence That a Written Contract is Subject to an Oral Con-
dition. 
590. Proof of Fundamental Assumptions on Which Agreement was 
Based. 
691. Evidence That One Promise in a Contract is Conditional upon 
a Return Performance—Failure of Consideration. 
592. Evidence of Oral Conditions Not Constituting the Agreed Ex-
change. 
593. Oral Evidence Admissible to Overcome Presumptions and In-
ferences. 
594. Oral Testimony Admissible to Prove a Collateral and Sepa-
rate Agreement. 
595. Question of Law or Question of Fact. 
596. Application of the Rule for or against Third Persons. 
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Ch. 26 THE PAROL EYiBENCB RULE 5 7 3 
§ 5 7 3 , The Rule is a Rule of Substantive Contract Law, Not 
a Rule of Evidence 
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it 
in a wri t ing to which they have both assented as the complete and 
accurate integration of tha t contract, evidence, whether parol 
or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will 
not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the 
writing.1 This is in substance what is called the "parol evidence 
I. This section Is quoted in Duulop 
Tiro & Ituhher Corp. v. Thompson, 
273 F.2d 'Mm (C.A.8th, 1050). In 
an action for the price of goods 
sold in accordance with a written 
contract, the defendant counter-
claimed for adjustments made with 
customers because of defects in 
the goods. The writing provided 
that there should he no adjust-
ments except by referring them to 
the seller. The defendant alleged 
that this provision had been elimi-
nated by a subsequent oral agree-
ment (in spite of a provision re-
quiring a signed writing). The 
court reviewed the evidence and 
held that there was none supj>ort-
ing the allegation of such a subse-
quent agreement. Then? was some 
testimony by the defendant that in 
the prior negotiations it was stated 
that, he might make adjustments 
without referring them to the 
seller; but he admitted knowing 
that the written contract provided 
otherwise. This shows why he al-
leged a "subsequent" agreement. 
The Uniform Commercial Code— 
Sales, Sec. 2—202 (1050 draft) 
reads: "Terms with respect to 
which the confirmatory memoranda 
of the parties agree or which are 
otherwise set forth in a writing 
Intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with 
respect to such terms as are in-
cluded therein may not be con-
tradicted by evidence of any prior 
or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or sup-
plemented (a) by course of dealing 
or usage of trade (§ 1—205) or by 
course of performance (§ 2—20S); 
and (b) by evidence of consistent 
additional terms unless the court 
finds the writing to have been in-
tended also as a complete and ex-
clusive statement of the terms 
agreed upon." 
This draft is believed to be consis-
tent with the statements made in 
the present Chapter. 
This section is quoted (nn. J, 2) in 
Johnson v. Dalton, 318 S.W.2d 115 
(Ky.1!)5S). See note on this case 
under § 577 n. 35. 
In Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. General 
Products Co., 351 A.2d 487, 
H I . (Jfl.11>), after breach of a 
contract by the defendant to de-
liver goods to the plaintiff, the par-
ties compromised and executed a 
written agreement that, the court 
holds to be supported by sufficient 
consideration and to operate as a 
novation discharging all claims un-
der the first contract. The court 
says that on these facts evidence 
of negotiations preliminary to the 
second agreement is excluded by 
the parol evidence rule; also, that 
such evidence cannot be considered 
even though it was admitted with-
out objection, for the reason that, 
the parol evidence rule is a rule 
of substantive law and not a rule 
of evidence. The court having 
found that the second contract was 
an operative novation, previous 
agreements and proposals are in-
deed rendered inoperative by a rule 
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§ 5 7 3 INTERPRETATION Pt. 3 
rule," a rule that scarcely deserves to be called a rule of evidence 
of any kind, and a rule that is as truly applicable to written evi-
dence as to parol evidence The use of such a name for this rule 
has had unfortunate consequences, principally by distracting the 
attention fiom the real issues that are involved2 These issues 
of subst m t i v e l a w ' , b u t t h i s i s 
the l aw of d i s c h a r g e by s u b s h t u t 
i d con t r ac t and n >t the pa ro l e \ i 
,1, „ < i uh 1 vid<n<< of p n o r ne 
h i t i l l Ions is not exc luded by a n y 
rule of e i t h e r s u b s t a n t i v e law o r 
e w l e n c e if it is offered to a id in 
in terpre t \ t ion of the second con 
t r a c t o r t o d e i n o n s t n t e i t s inva l id ! 
ty for a n j re ison 1 lie s a m e re 
sui t would o b t a i n if t h e s u b s t i t u t e d 
c o n t r i t t w e r e o ra l ins tead of in 
w n t i n g 
In M itte r of Mil ler s T s t a t e 348 P 2d 
1(H* 1W» K a n 87 (1Q(»0) t he c o u r t 
held t h a t t h e j o in t will before 
the c o u r t w i s not c o n t r a c t u a l o r 
in ide in p u r s u nice of a c o n t r a c t . 
I t quoted t h u s from i f i i m e r opin 
ion I \ t n n s i c evidence Is a d n u s 
slble in count ctioii w i th the i n s t m 
m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s to show t h a t 
s e p a r a t e wi l l s w e r e ex 
ecuted in p u r s u a n c e of an a g r e e 
merit be tween t h e t e s t a t o r s no t 
w i t h s t a n d i n g the absence of r e 
c i t a l s in t in wi l l s de s i t u a t i n g o r 
r e f e m n g to such ag reemen t S u c h 
evidence m e y cons i s t of w r i t i n g s 
a c t s and d e c l a r a t i o n s of t h e p i r 
t ies t e s t i m o n y of o t h e r pe r sons ind 
evidence of a l l t h e s u r r o u n d i n g 
fac ts i n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s In t h i s 
e i s e t h e r e w a s no such e x t r i n s i c 
evidence a n d a f t e r ca re fu l i n t e r 
pre tat ion t h e c o u r t found no such 
evidence in t h e will itself 
2 ' It is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t con 
fusion r e s u l t s f i o m a ru le calleei 
'the paro l ev idence ru le wh ich is 
not a ru l e of evielence which re 
1 i tes to e x t r i n s i c proof w h e t h e r 
w r i t t e n or pa ro l and which h i s 
been sa id to be v i r t ua l l y no r u l e 
a t al l Zell v A m e r i c a n S e a t i n g 
Co H 8 I 2d (>41 ( C C A 2d 1043) 
Since the rule dcte i mines k j . i l op 
e n t t i t n m d not m e n admiss ib i l i 
ty it is i i u l e of subs tan t ive 1 iw 
such t h a t t h e fcdei il c o u r t s m u s t 
apply i t in acceml nice w i t h ip 
p l i c ib l e St i te 1 iw L o n g v Moi 
n s 12S 1 2d boi 141 A L U 1041 
( C C A 3d 1042) 
In ( d e rson v I i r s t N a t H a n k of 
S p r i n g I a k e 100 N J F q 502 130 
A 3_J (1027) t h e m a k e i of a no t e 
to tho b m k al leged t h a t h e ex 
ecu ted i t in r e l i a n c e on t h e b a n k s 
p romise t h a t he shou ld n o t h a v e 
to p i y it col lect ion to be m a d e 
f rom a n o t h e r T h e m a k e r s o u g h t 
a n in junc t ion a g a i n s t a su i t i t 1 iw 
on t h e no te Be r r y V C t h o u g h t 
t h a t t he pa ro l ev idence ru le would 
p r e v e n t proof of such a p r o m i s e 
a t l aw b u t n o t in e q u i t y H e sa id 
T h e r e a s o n s given by c o u r t s of 
equ i ty for t h e aelmission of p a r o l 
evidence a s app l i ed to w r i t t e n con 
t r a c t s w h e r e c o u r t s of l a w re fuse 
such admis s ion a r e va r i ed a n d 
fine d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e d r a w n be tween 
the admis s ion of p a r o l ev idence to 
v a r y o r a l t e r tho t e r m s of a w r i t 
ten a g i e e m e n t and p a i o l ev idence 
showing f a c t s w h i e h con t ro l i t s 
ope ra t i on M a n y of t h e s e d i s t i n c 
t i ons a r e in m y j u d g m e n t d i s 
t i n c t i o n s w i t h o u t a difference b u t 
the re is no occasion to qu ibb le 
a b o u t t h e m a t t e r I lie t r u t h is 
t h a t t h e p i r o l ev idence ru l e h a s 
been appl ied o r elisi* j , t i ded in 
c o u i t s of equity a s t he enels of 
j u s t i c e r equ i r ed l i k e al l o t h e r 
l ega l r u l e s i t is in equ i ty , n o b a r 
to j u s t i c e Vo lumes h a v e been 
w r i t t e n to e x p l a i n o r define t h e 
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may be any one or more of the following (1) Have the parties 
made a contract7 (2) Is that contract void or voidable because 
of illegality, fraud, mistake, or any other reason7 (3) Did the 
parties assent to a particular wilting as the complete and accurate 
"integration" of that contract73 
suj,M sf<d d i s t inc t ions bu t a s t h e 
vvh le dec t r ine of equ i t ab le j u r i s 
pi II le i ce lias been bui l t u p in op 
I sine n to and in d i s i e „ u e l of 
lej.il rules why Hhould we l abor 
t » hud a wnj a roun 1 e r 1 » I f )r 
i h le in the* legal fe nee if t h e 
en Is of j u s t i ce r equ i re it eeputj 
in IV huiellc is well a s go a r ainel 
a n d in my j u d g m e n t i t is m u c h 
b e t t e r to acknowledge t h i s fac t 
t hen to mult iply subterfuge and 
excuse to exp la in the app l ica t ion 
of t h e p n o l ev ide nee iule in e ejuity, 
when it needs no expl in the n ex 
ce p t t h a t jus t i ce de m mels it ' 
I lie Vice Chince l lo i held h»wever 
th it the bank w a s a lmldcr in d u e 
c o u r s e and had not au tho r i zed any 
o lheer t> mike t h e allej.ee! eiral 
a^ie erne ut 1 lie Vice f h i n e e l l o r 
vv is s i t t ing in the s p n il < in t 
of e epntv t i n t unt i l 101S < \ ts te .1 m 
Pscvv 1 iscv whe neve l the eemit 
s y s t e m s hive been un ilj, mi i ted 
in to one tnel I iw and < ciuity lie lei 
iniiiKle M el t< „ the i in my pi ) 
cee l ing w h i t h hiys d >wn is the 
pi te lie e m e eput} sheiulel pie \ ill 
over inj me n^ste nt pi »e ti e in 
the f nine r c o u i t s of e mini n 1 iw 
3 V c nti n t in iv 1 e bel 1 to I e 
fullv ii l „i de d in w i ttinj. e vc u 
thouj.li th le i n s c v e i i l \ \ i i t in j , s 
in w In ! j u t s < f the < nti i t ne 
eonl un I See 0 u i t is v Pie i< e 
1-2 s I _0S K 7 C l 717 <10_M) 
) lid f I de e el line lit I \ me! w n t 
ilig se t t inj , e lit te n i ls e f ij.iee l imit 
Mj, ( M ive r &. (e> v ^n t i th _MO 
T \> 112 Oi r>r>0 (1 >_I) tl n e 
te le „i mis ( < liMele i iK > c< ip 
r a t l i n ! mis issue el il >nj, w tth md 
seeuieel b} inoi tUi H «s uiel t ius f 
i n d e n t u r e s Kullow i v I he lmoid 
Co 17G A 50(> 114 N J L 205 
(193)) 
I n M o y c r v He live il 40 A 2d 514 
1)0 P a S u p e r dlO (104(») t he c o u r t 
eo i i ee t ly found t h a t the ie had been 
n > c miplc te title M itlon of a 
c o n t r a c t of e m p l o y m e n t even 
t h o u g h the e m p l o y e r s l e t t e r eon 
t u n i n g e e i t u n p rov i s ions w i s 
m i l k e d icceptcd by the employee 
a n d w i s followed by t h e l i t t e r s 
l e t t e r d e s c u b i i i g h is d u t i e s a s t he 
e m p l o y e r h a d reepiested N e i t h e r 
l e t t e r r e f e r r ed to the t e r m of em 
p l o y m e n t winch h a d been p i e v i o u s 
ly agreed on o r illy 
I n Che s ton I I sh< i m a n Co v 
Ti ice lbe ig 1 rt A 2d ( S 211 Aid 12* 
(10T7) the pi nut in l y i l e t t e r el it 
ed M u c l i 10 in iele an offe i t > sup 
plv <ei I dn goods on fullv spe ( Hi d 
t e i m s On M u c h _1 the p n t t e s 
h i d i Ceutve i s i t ion liy tele pit ne in 
whic ll (as the ti i ll ce ui t fenind) the 
pi tint lrr m ide i lite difie 1 ofle r On 
M ll ll _2 the ele fe nd mt Wleitc We 
he u by ae e e pt v Mil pi p s il 
1 b c u i t be I 1 tb it 
It w is a quest i n cf f ic t for t h e 
t n i l com t to de termine vv he t i ter 
t h i s i< e pt me e le fe ne 1 t » the w i it 
ten offe i o r to the tllej.e<l ofle i by 
telephone iNo t i n t e i il ev idence 
to e le tennine t h i s in itte r w i s ad 
nuss i l le I lie pi un t i l ! s i i j .uni<nt 
th it the two l e t t e r s of M u e h 10 
m 1 M nc b — nt t le m in te„ ! ite el 
c nti ie t th it e \e lueb d the ol il e vi 
ele nee \ v n s d i s i | | i \ ed T h e c o u r t 
ci ted §§ 535 536 537 of t h i s tre a 
ttse 
In M i u p h y v l o i s t n c k {00 S W 2d 
7 (7 ( M V) »S> t h e p u t i e s s^itee!
 t 
w r i t i n g of i few l ines l i be l ed ( o n 
t r a c t cons i s t ing of t he fo l lowing 
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Cases holding that a writing was only a partial integration are 
noted below.74,5 
§ 5 8 2 , Evidence That the Writing was Not Assented to as 
a Complete and Accurate Integration 
There are thousands of cases in which courts have declared 
that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the 
74.5 In Van Horn Irrigated Farms, 
inc. v. Leonard, 205 S.W.2d 510 
(Tex.Civ.App.1050), one party as-
serted that a certain writing con-
tained the whole of the terms of 
trout raet agreed on (a complete "in-
tegration"), and the other asserted 
that it represented only a part of 
a contract previously agreed upon 
orally. The court held that this 
issue must be determined by in-
terpretation of all the words and 
acts of the parties, and that in the 
case before it the writing was only 
a "partial integration," the true 
contract being partly written and 
partly in the previous oral negotia-
tion. See also § 582. 
In Universal Major Elec. Appliances 
v. Glen wood Kange Co., 223 F.2d 70 
(C.A.4th, 1055), the court held that 
the parol evidence rule does not ex-
clude testimony of an oral war-
ranty in case the writing is only a 
partial integration, even though 
there is one express warranty in 
the writing. This is in harmony 
with the present section. 
In Silverstein v. Dohoney, 108 A.2d 
451, 32 N.J.Super. 357 (1054), af-
firmed 115 A.2d 1, 10 N.J. 1, a writ-
ten contract provided for space to 
be occupied by cigarette vending 
machines. A payment of $40 was 
acknowledged ; but "other good and 
valuable consideration" was men-
tioned and it was stated that 
monthly commissions were to be 
paid to the lessor. This was held 
to be only a "partial integration" 
and oral testimony as to the amount 
of commissions was held admissible. 
In resolving doubts, the court 
quoted this treatise, § 95. 
A written contract was held to be 
only a partial integration in 
Searne's Challenge v. M. I). Omni 
Co., 04 N.W.L'd 830, 207 Wis. 13i 
(1054). Parol evidence of prior ne-
gotiations is admissible "where it 
appears from the surrounding facts 
and circumstances that the writing 
was not an integration of the entire 
transaction." Here the writing 
bore a notation "see letter." 
Where the description of lots sold, in 
a written contract, is incomplete 
and incorrect, parol evidence of the 
representations made in the negotia-
tions as to the size and shape of the 
lots is admissible. The writing is 
only a partial integration. Specific 
performance of the contract was 
denied. (Jeorgiades v. Biggs, 00 S. 
E.2d 850, 107 Va. G30 (1050). 
In Roudebush Realty Co. v. Toby, 135 
N.E.2d 270, 00 Ohio App. 524 (1055) 
the defendant executed a writing 
giving the plaintiff an "exclusive 
agency" to sell property on commis-
sion, with nothing said as to time 
or method of termination. The 
court held that the writing was "in-
complete on its face" and that pi rol 
evidence was admissible to prove 
that at the time the writing was 
executed the defendant had stated 
orally that the agency would last 
until the property was sold. See 
note under § 50 n. 00. 
Sections 581-583 are cited by Wolfe, 
C. J. in Jackson v. Jackson, 253 P. 
2d 214, 219, 122 Utah 507 (1953). 
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terms of a written contract.15 It is stated in the form of a rule 
of evidence for the exclusion of offered testimony. In many of 
these cases, however, the published report itself shows that the 
offered testimony was actually heard and its credibility weighed. 
In spite of it, the court finds that there was a complete and ac-
curate integration in writing, and then justifies its decision by 
repeating the "parol evidence rule" to the effect that such testi-
mony is not admissible to vary or contradict the writing.76 
75. The following cases illustrate 
the supposed rule: 
DeWitt v. Kerry, 10 S.Ct. 530, 134 U. 
S. 300, 33 L.Ed. 800 (1889), where 
the writing contained an express 
warranty that goods would be like 
those sold to a third party and also 
like sample, the court held that ft" 
additional oral warranty of quality 
was not provable. 
Browning v. Haskell, 39 Mass. (22 
Pick.) 310 (1&30), excluded oral tes-
timony of a lessor, when offered 
to show that she signed the lease 
under protest and in reliance on the 
oral promise of the tenant to exe-
cute a lease on different terms with-
in two days. This was not a case 
of conditional delivery. 
In Smith v. Jeffryes, 15 M. & W. 561 
(1810), a contract to deliver "ware 
potatoes", was shown by plaintiff's 
testimony to mean the largest and 
best quality of three different qual-
ities grown in the neighborhood. 
The court held that it was error to 
admit testimony of the defendant 
that the plaintiff had said that the 
potatoes he sold were "Regents 
ware" potatoes, and not "kidney 
wares". The court gave no opinion 
justifying the decision. It would 
be dillicult to write one. 
In Violette v. Rice, 53 N.E. 144, 173 
Mass. 82 (1800), the plaintiff was 
employed by a written contract in 
which she promised "to render 
services at any theatres," and "to 
conform to all the rules and regu-
lations adopted by" the theatre em-
ployer. The court would not admit 
testimony by the plaintiff that the 
defendant had orally agreed to em-
ploy her in the part of Bertha 
Uessler in a play called Excelsior 
Junior. This was believed by the 
court to contradict the terms of 
the writing. Opinion by Holmes, 
J. 
Where a marine insurance policy rep-
resented the ship as "Swedish", 
oral testimony to show that she 
was in fact American, and was 
described as "Swedish" to fool the 
British then at war with the United 
States, and that, the defendant in 
surer knew these facts, was held 
not to be admissible. "There can-
not be a usage, by which a war-
ranty that a vessel was neutral 
should be held to mean that she was 
not neutral, but only pretended to 
be so." Lewis v. Thatcher, 15 
Mass. 431 (1810). 
Such a case is Eason v. Thomas, 00 
8.E.2U 720, 208 Ga. 822 (1052), 
where the true price of land as 
agreed upon was intentionally un-
derstated in the written instrument. 
76. No opinion can be hazarded, 
without careful reading of thou-
sands of cases, as to the proportion 
of them to which the above state-
ment is applicable; that is, the in-
stances in which the parol evidence 
is said to be inadmissible after 
some or all of it has in fact been 
heard and weighed. Such an ex-
tensive research is not possible for 
the purposes of the present treatise 
on the law of contracts. 
The applications of the "parol evi-
dence rule" by the courts of North 
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Having admitted and weighed the evidence to determine wheth-
er there is such an integration in writing and having found that 
there is, that very evidence becomes quite immaterial for the 
purpose of varying or contradicting the integration that sup-
planted and nullified it. It was material and was admissible on 
one issue; but the decision of that issue is that the parties agreed 
to substitute one written integration for all their antecedent ne-
gotiations. Until this decision is reached, we can not know that 
there has been such a substitution. The evidence may clearly 
show that there was no agreement to substitute the written in-
strument for a former oral agreement, in which case an action 
for breach of that oral agreement is not prevented by the parol 
evidence rule.77 
Caro l ina a r e shown in g r e a t de ta i l 
by C h n d h o u r n and McCormick in 9 
N.C.Law Kov. 151 (11)31). T h e 
a u t h o r s i nd ica t e t h e imposs ib i l i ty 
of reconci l ing al l t h e dec i s ions ; 
and they a l so p rove the e x t r e m e 
l ibera l i ty w i t h which the c o u r t s 
h a v e a d m i t t e d ora l evidence of 
a n t e c e d e n t a g r e e m e n t s v a r y i n g o r 
a d d i n g to a wr i t i ng . I t is bel ieved 
t h a t a s i m i l a r su rvey of t he ca se s 
of t he o t h e r s t a t e s would show 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y the s ame resu l t . 
See, also, Ha le , " T h e Pa ro l Ev idence 
Rule ," 4 Or .L.Rev. 01 (1025); Mc-
Wil l i ams , " T h e P a r o l E v i d e n c e 
Rule in Ca l i fo rn ia , " 7 Cal .L.Kev. 
117 (MHO). 
77. U . S . - U n i t e d S t a t e s Nav . Co. v. 
Hlack Diamond Lines , 124 F.2d 50N 
(C.C.A.1M JO 12). 
Conn.- H y d r o C e n t r i f u g a l s v. C r a w -
ford L a u n d r y Co., 117 A. HI, 110 
Conn. 40 (1020). 
Tenn.—Cobb v. Wal lace , 45 Tenn . (5 
c.,id.) ."•:«» ( is t i s ) . 
Wis.—-Danielson v. Hank of Scan-
d inav ia , 2:m N . W . s:i, 201 w i s . 302, 
70 A.L.K. 740 (10.S0). 
In Fcdele v. Dow ling, 201 I \2d 205, 
120 Cal.App.2d 427 (1053) severa l 
wr i t t en d r a f t s and p a p e r s w e r e held 
not to h a v e been agreed upon a s a 
complete in t eg ra t ion . T h e c o u r t 
s a i d : " D e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t 
t h e cou r t imprope r ly p e r m i t t e d p a -
rol evidence to v a r y t he t e r m s of a 
w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t is w i t h o u t mer i t . 
T h e exc lu s iona ry a spec t of t he pa -
rol ev idence ru le conies in to OIH)ra-
t ion when the p a r t i e s h a v e a d o p t e d 
a w r i t i n g or w r i t i n g s a s a s ing le , 
final and comple te exp res s ion of 
t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 
In C a r o l i n a C a s u a l t y Ins . Co. v. 
H e l m s , 248 F.2d 208 (C.A.fith, 1057), 
a n o r a l con t r ac t of l iabi l i ty insur -
ance w a s m a d e on A u g u s t 12, t o 
t a k e effect on t h a t day . T h e de-
f e n d a n t execu ted a policy on t h a t 
day , in which the effective d a t e w a s 
s t a t e d to be A u g u s t 1 5 ; b u t t h e 
policy w a s no t de l ivered to t h e 
plaint iff un t i l a f t e r t h e acc iden t 
wh ich happened on A u g u s t 14. P a -
rol evidence of t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t 
w a s not excluded by t h e pa ro l evi-
dence rule , because t he w r i t t e n pol-
icy (which conformed in eve ry re-
spec t to t h e o ra l proof excep t a s to 
t h e da te ) w a s never a s sen ted to by 
t h e plaintiff a s a final and a c c u r a t e 
" i n t e g r a t i o n " of t h e o ra l c o n t r a c t . 
T h e s t a t u t e of f r a u d s does no t re-
q u i r e a con t r ac t of i n s u r a n c e to be 
in w r i t i n g . 
An o r a l c o n t r a c t of i n s u r a n c e is no t 
d i s c h a r g e d by t h e fact t h a t the In-
s u r e r execu ted a policy on different 
t e r m s , t h e insured a t once ob jec t ing 
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The fact that the rule has been stated in such a definite and 
dogmatic form as a rule of admissibility is unfortunate. It has 
an air of authority and certainty that has grown with much repe-
tition. Without doubt, it has deterred counsel from making an 
adequate analysis and research and from offering parol testimony 
that was admissible for many purposes. Without doubt, also, 
it has caused a court to refuse to hear testimony that ought to 
have been heard. The mystery of the written word is still such 
that a paper document may close the door to a showing that it 
was never assented to as a complete integration. 
No injustice is done by exclusion of the testimony if the written 
integration is in fact what the court assumes or decides that it 
is. If it is in fact a complete and correct integration of the terms 
on which the parties are agreed, all of their antecedent under-
standings and agreements are in truth merged in and discharged 
to the va r i a t ion . In such a case , q u i r e m e n t s of t h e code. T h e c o u r t 
t h e r e is no " i n t e g r a t i o n " in w r i t - held t h a t the complaint , s e t t i ng ou t 
i n g ; and the paro l evidence r u l e t he e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t s t a t ed a case 
h a s no appl ica t ion . Amer ican S u r e - j u s t i f y i n g a decree for specific per-
ty Co. of N. Y. v. Wil l i ford, 243 F.2d f o r m a n e e w i t h compensiit ion for t h e 
404 (C.A.Sth, 1057). cost «»f m a k i n g the bu i ld ing comply 
See Uray.il v. Dupree , 254 l \ 2 d 1041, w i t h t h e code. See no te on t h i s 
107 Or. 5S1 (105.1), s ta ted u n d e r §§ ca se u n d e r g 551 11. .'{5. 
n!,;{
«
 r,!,r
»- In Keeker v. Lnger<pii<t Uro thc r s , .'MS 
See a lso Hicks v. S immons, 271 F.2d I \ 2 d 42.'5, 55 Wash .2d (1000), t he 
S75 (C.A.lOth, 1050), noted here in plaint iff al leged and the t r i a l c o u r t 
unde r § 504 n. 2. found t h a t t he de fendan t fa land de-
See Scluro v. W. K. Could & Co., 105 veloper) adve r t i s ed i ts p romise to 
N.K.2d UNO, 18 lll.2d 5.'5S (1000), P^ve a c e r t a i n s t ree t , a p romise 
where a wr i t t en con t rac t for t he m a d e to induce p u r c h a s e r s to buy 
sa le of a lot conta ined no e x p r e s s improved lots o 11 sa le by t lie defend-
promise by the vendor to const m e t a n t > n , ,<l , , , ! , r iUo plaintiff m a d e a 
a bui lding accord ing to any speeili- p u r c h a s e in re l iance on the promise , 
n i l ions, but in which a large pay- I " m a k i n g (he ac tua l p u r c h a s e , the 
incut was express ly required when only wr i t ing w a s an "earnes t -money 
the bui lding w a s completed a n d rece ip t , " in which no th ing w a s said 
r eady for occupancy. Wi thou t m a k - a b o u t p a v i n g the s t ree t . T h e c o u r t 
ing any reference to the "parol evi- s u s t a i n e d an ac t ion to enforce t he 
deuce ru le ," the court had no hesi- p r o m i s e to pave the s t ree t , holding 
tency in finding a promise by t h e t h a t proof of the an tecedent p romise 
vendor to cons t ruc t a bui lding a n d w a s not exc luded by e i the r t h e "pa-
even to cons t ruc t it so as to comply rol ev idence ru l e " (which w a s "no t 
wi th the ci ty bui ld ing code m a k i n g a n e x c l u s i o n a r y device") or the 
r c ( | u i i emen t s a s to p lumbing a n d s t a t u t e of f r auds . T h e " e a r n e s t 
sewerage . T h e r e w a s no re fe rence money r ece ip t " w a s held not to be a 
to the code in the wr i t t en cont rac t ; comple te in t eg ra t ion . See a l so 
and the repor t con ta ins no th ing to no t e s u n d e r §§ 574 11. 4 ; 570 11. 2 0 ; 
show t h a t the pa r t i e s knew the re- 504 n. 1. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL p R oviSIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes ordinances rules, or 
leguiations whose interpretation is determinative of (he appeal OF of central 
importance to the appeal oi this matter. 
